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“Betting on nature” or “betting on 
others”: anti-coordination induces 
uniquely high levels of entropy
Gabriele Chierchia1,3, Rosemarie Nagel4 & Giorgio Coricelli2,3
Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other 
players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically 
compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option 
in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti 
coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively 
increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects’ certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific 
safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-
coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the 
other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain 
options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to 
any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in 
strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting 
with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.
“Half a century ago, when decision theory and game theory were young, it was common to perceive a dichotomy 
between (i) games against nature, in which the “adversary” is a neutral “nature”—and (ii) strategic games, in 
which the adversary is an interested party […]. No need was seen to reconcile or even relate the approaches. In 
the ensuing years, the dichotomy gradually disappeared. It was recognized that games against nature and strate-
gic games are in principle quite similar, and can—perhaps should—be treated similarly. Specifically, a player in 
a strategic game should be able to form subjective probabilities over the strategies of the other players, and then 
choose his own strategy so as to maximize his expected utility with respect to these subjective probabilities.” 
(Aumann and Dreze1).
Many financial and daily decisions involve “betting” on others. Deciding whether to bet on what may turn 
out to be a speculative bubble, to join a rebellion, to invest in a new technology, critically depends on what we 
think others will do: if others bet on the same bubble it may hold long enough to provide revenue, if others also 
join the rebellion it may succeed, and if they invest in the same technology it might become the new standard2. In 
the opening passage above, Aumann and Dreze ask the following question: can and should such social decisions 
be treated similarly to bets on “blind nature”? On the one hand they could: agents would maximize their utility 
based on their beliefs on which states of the worlds will occur, whether these depend on others or not. On the 
other hand, in games against nature, this state of the world is the result of a mechanistic process, while in games 
against others, it is the result of a motivated decision process, where others may form beliefs about what we will 
choose, or iteratively, about what we think they will choose etc. With this in mind, Aumann and Dreze argue, 
the structure of the game can change. Hence the question: does betting on others fundamentally change the way 
humans face uncertainty?
Aumann and Dreze illustrate this problem formally. Here we investigate the matter empirically, by sys-
tematically comparing “how” experimental participants make decisions (and not just “which” decisions they 
make) in various environments involving either another player or nature (i.e., “lotteries”), while keeping poten-
tial monetary outcomes identical across environments. Among the many types of “games against others”, we 
focus on coordination games because “risk” has already been invoked to explain the way agents may face these 
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problems3. In fact, while a subset of interactions with others can be “solved” by deductive reasoning, that is, by 
Nash-equilibrium (“NE”) analysis, coordination games involve multiple NE, thus raising a problem of “equilib-
rium selection”4, or what has also been called “strategic uncertainty”5. We asked whether the strategic uncertainty 
encountered in a coordination game is similar to that encountered under the more traditional notion of risk and 
uncertainty, one that conceptualizes (and measures) uncertainty through the use of lotteries6.
Among coordination games, we further focus on the “stag hunt” game (henceforth “SH”, also called assurance 
game) and the entry game (“EG”, also called the chicken game), because these are paradigmatic of two “oppo-
site declinations” of coordination. SHs have in fact been called the “building block” of situations with “strategic 
complementarities” (Camerer2): games in which agents have an incentive to match their choices, and which are 
known to foster cooperation7,8. For instance, in the rebellion case sketched above, either all rebel or no one does, 
but mismatched choices are costly. EGs on the other hand involve “strategic substitutability”: environments in 
which agents have an incentive to mismatch their choices, and which can be conducive to competition9,10. For 
instance, all might prefer to be the few ones on the freeway, though doing so all at the same time could lead to a 
traffic jam. Similarly, in many markets, agents know that if too many others invest in the same asset (i.e., “enter” 
the market), there will be a disadvantageous price war2. In synthesis, SHs involve pure coordination - situations 
in which agents should match their actions - while EGs involve anti-coordination - situations in which agents 
should choose opposite actions.
In our stag hunt variant - adapted from Heinemann et al.11 (see Camerer2, and Devetag and Ortmann12, for 
reviews on other variants) - pairs of anonymous players choose between one of two options, without knowing 
what the other chooses, without communication and without being informed about previous outcomes (to pre-
clude learning by experience). One of these two options is generally “low paying” but “safe” and if a participant 
chooses this option, he/she obtains a given Euro amount for sure, for instance €2.00, regardless of what the other 
chooses. We thus call this option the “SP” (as in “safe” or “sure” payoff). On the other hand, one can obtain a 
relatively higher gain, for instance €15.00, by selecting the other option. However, this higher payoff is obtained 
only if one’s counterpart also chooses this “uncertain option” (henceforth, “UP”), that is, if one chooses the UP 
alone, he/she earns nothing at all. As mentioned above, deductive rationality (i.e., game theory) has little to say as 
to what to choose in SHs – though see Carlsson and Damme13 and Morris and Shin14 for notable game theoretic 
refinements introducing uncertainty and signals about payoffs which can lead to a unique equilibrium in such 
games -, if not that agents should try to “match” their choices: either “both choose the SP”, or “both choose the 
UP”, but mismatched choices are disadvantageous. Indeed, these are the two (pure-strategy) NEs of the game.
However, following Harsanyi & Selten’s notion of “risk-dominance”3, there is another strong intuition that, 
even retaining the SH structure, specific payoff differences may matter very much. Indeed, as we illustrate below, 
empirically, they do11,15,16. The example provided above of a SH with SP = €2.00 (for sure) and UP = €15.00 (if 
both choose it, €0, otherwise) should seem trivial to most and, indeed, most experimental participants coordinate 
successfully on the (Pareto-efficient) UP option in a SH with those parameters11. However, what if (all else being 
equal) the value of the SP was raised to €8.00? Empirically, many participants cease to choose the UP and now 
choose the SP. It follows that each participant will have his or her idiosyncratic “threshold” and that this can be 
measured by having participants make repeated choices (without feedback) over a sensible range of parameters 
(i.e., increasing SP values), and observing at which point they switch between options (much as in the tradition of 
establishing certainty equivalents or risk premiums, as well perceptual thresholds in classic psychophysics exper-
iments). In line with this, Heinemann and colleagues11 compared choices in a SH with choices in a lottery with 
identical payoffs (that is, instead of “betting on others” participants were to bet on a lottery, which “selects” UP or 
SP with a given probability) and showed that participants clearly used threshold strategies across both domains.
Returning to EGs, these involve strategic anti-coordination, but can nonetheless be represented in a superfi-
cially very similar way to SHs. In fact, to transform the SH above into an EG, as shown by Nagel et al.17, it is suffi-
cient to only alter the consequences of choosing the UP option, all else being equal: in EGs participants earn the 
higher payoff only if they choose the UP and their counterpart “does not”. Like SHs, EGs have two pure strategy 
NE (either “I choose UP and you don’t” or vice versa) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, based on 
cognitive hierarchy models of reasoning18–20, we hypothesize that subjects should display a particular decision 
pattern in EGs. Specifically, we expect depth of reasoning to change choices, and thus increase entropy, in EGs, 
but not SHs, as we illustrate below.
Cognitive hierarchy models assume that subjects may perform different levels of strategic/recursive reasoning 
in interdependent decision problems: “0-level” players perform no strategic reasoning at all, and choose each 
available option with uniform probability (i.e., as a random lottery). Level-1 players assume that they are inter-
acting with level-0 players, level-2 players assume they are mostly playing level-1 players, but also with some 
level 0 players, and so forth. Let us now return to our previously exemplified SH parameters (SP = €2.00 and 
UP = €15.00), and consider what cognitive hierarchy models would call a “level-1 thinker”. Such a level-1 thinker 
assumes that his or her counterpart will be a “level-0 thinker”, that is, a player who chooses randomly, by selecting 
SP or UP with a uniform distribution (i.e., in our binary choice case, p = 0.5). Since choosing the UP when play-
ing with a randomizing counterpart yields €15.00 or 0 with equal probability, the expected value of choosing UP 
for a risk neutral level-1 thinker is €7.50; since this is higher than the alternative SP of €2.00, a level-1 thinker is 
predicted to choose the UP in a SH with these parameters. Lets now consider a level-2 thinker in the exact same 
game. This player now assumes that his counterpart could be a level-1 player and thus that such a counterpart will 
choose the UP (given the reasoning above). This in turn provides assurance to the level-2 player, who now has an 
incentive to choose the UP as well (in order to match the choice of the level-1 counterpart). Importantly, increas-
ing levels of reasoning further doesn’t alter this pattern because level-2 players will want to match level-1 players, 
and level-3 players will match level-2 players etc20. In short, increasing levels of reasoning doesn’t alter UP/SP 
choices in SHs: players only need to think of the probability with which the counterpart choose the UP choice.
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However, this is not the case in EGs. In fact, if one performs the same reasoning above on an EG with iden-
tical payoffs it becomes clear that, as in a SH, a level-1 player is predicted to choose UP but that, in contrast to 
SHs, a level 2 player will now “switch” his/her choice by choosing SP. In fact, if a level-2 player expects his/her 
counterpart to choose the UP in an EG with SP = €2.00, this no longer provides assurance like in the SH, rather, 
it provides deterrence from attempting to choose the UP, since both players would earn nothing in this case. 
Moreover, agents would be expected to mentally alternate back and forth between the SP and UP choices as their 
depth of reasoning increases. We thus reasoned that, since hierarchical reasoning cannot be applied to “blind 
nature” (which, in a way, is always level-0) and does not alter choices in SHs, then subjects should change their 
choices more frequently in EGs, relative to any of the other environments. Operationally, we thus predicted that 
not only subjects may be likely to have distinct beliefs about the choices of their counterparts in SHs and EGs (and 
thus display distinct thresholds), but also that, especially in EGs, subjects would more frequently switch between 
SP and UP choices. In other words, especially under anti-coordination, we expected to observe more frequent 
violations of monotonicity, or entropy. Furthermore, to investigate whether this could be simply due to EGs fos-
tering more random behavior or noise we first investigated whether anti-coordination would be associated with 
increased decision times - which are considered a typical hallmark of deliberative cognitive processes, cognitive 
load21,22 or, more simply, task difficulty23. Second, we assessed how switch frequency affected expected payoff in 
EGs, relative to the other decision environments. Third, we evaluated whether the specific switch frequencies we 
observe are consistent with known distributions of levels or reasoning in games20.
Finally, irrespective of levels of reasoning, subjects might simply expect more variable behavior from their 
counterparts in EGs than SHs, which might decrease their confidence in their own judgments (i.e., their beliefs). 
In non-social decision environments, decreased confidence has frequently been labeled “ambiguity”, and it has 
been associated with aversion to uncertainty. For instance, as originally suggested by Ellsberg24, subjects may pre-
fer to bet on an urn that contains precisely 50 “winning balls” and 50 losing ones, rather than an urn containing 
an unspecified mixture of the two colors. Since in the second but not the first urn subjects may speculate over 
what the success probability is, ambiguity has also been operationalized as variance in second-order probabili-
ties25. In line with this, previous studies have documented aversion to uncertainty in anti-coordination games or 
affinity for uncertainty in coordination games26–28, suggesting there may be a link between anti-coordination and 
ambiguity26. However those studies only focused on betting preferences and not on entropy. We thus aimed to 
systematically compare both measures in coordination vs. anti-coordination games, as well as risky vs. ambiguous 
lotteries. This ambiguity also parallels the missing objective success probability in the coordination games, and as 
a contrast to it, we further introduced risky lotteries, in which the success probability was known.
We experimentally investigate this by analyzing incentivized choices under uncertainty involving either 
real lotteries (i.e., risk or ambiguity) or others (i.e., coordination vs. anti-coordination) (Fig. 1, see Methods for 
details). In each environment, subjects were to choose between a safe option, worth a given monetary amount 
(e.g., €7.00), and an uncertain option (always worth €15.00 or €0). As proxies for uncertainty, we compared the 
probability of choosing the uncertain option (as opposed to the safe one) in each environment and then measured 
subjects’ “revealed uncertainty” by gradually increasing the value of the safe option (without feedback) and com-
puting the value at which they “switched” between the two options, i.e., their “certainty equivalents”. Importantly, 
we also measure subjects’ “entropy”, as well as their decision times (see Methods for details).
Results
A generalized logistic hierarchical model revealed that in each decision environment increasing values of the 
SP significantly decrease the probability of choosing the UP option (i.e., all slopes are negative and significant, 
ps < 0.001) (Fig. 2). However, the entry game significantly interacted with the SP term in predicting the likelihood 
of choosing the UP option (p < 0.001). Specifically, while at low SPs, the probability of choosing the UP was lower 
in entry games than either of the lotteries (p < 0.001), this pattern was reversed at high sure payoffs. The stag hunt 
also interacted more weakly, but significantly (p < 0.05) with the SP, suggesting that it especially increased the 
likelihood of choosing the UP at relatively higher SP values, as compared to the other decision environments. In 
contrast to this, the likelihood of choosing the UP did not differentially interact with increasing SPs in the two lot-
teries (i.e., their two slopes were similar), though the probability was overall significantly decreased by ambiguity.
In line with this, signed-rank tests confirmed that certainty equivalents (Fig. 3) were higher in the stag hunt 
than in any of the other environments (all ps < 0.001) and were higher in the risky lotteries than then the ambig-
uous ones (p < 0.01). Interestingly however, certainty equivalents were non-dissociable between the entry game 
and the ambiguous lotteries (p = 0.86), thus yielding the following overall pattern of inequalities with regards to 
certainty equivalents: entry game = ambiguity <risky lotteries (p = 0.5) <stag hunt.
All though the entry game and the ambiguous lotteries did not differ in terms of certainty equivalents, entropy 
was clearly higher in the entry game than any of the other environments (all ps < 0.001). For instance, on aver-
age, participants switched choices 4 times in the entry game (~22%) and 2.7 times in the stag hunt (~14%) (the 
medians were 3 and 1 respectively), these different frequencies were highly significant (p <0.001). In contrast, 
entropy levels did not significantly differ between stag hunts, risky and ambiguous lotteries (all ps > 0.25) (Fig. 4, 
left panel). Correspondingly, when participants chose the UP, they took more time to do so in the entry game 
than any of the other environments (all ps < 0.01) (Fig. 4, right panel). Moreover, and conversely, UP choices were 
temporally facilitated in stag hunts, relative to any of the other environments (all ps < 0.05).
We asked whether this observed average of 4 switches in the entry game is consistent with the average 
thresholds rates predicted by cognitive hierarchy theories for our game parameters. Following existing evidence 
regarding the distribution of levels of reasoning20, we assumed a Poisson distribution of k-level players with 
a lambda = 1.5. This distribution includes 22% level-0 players - which could be expected to randomly switch 
between SP and UP, thus on average 9 of 18 times – and 33% level-1 players – which should exhibit perfect thresh-
old strategies (1 switch, at SP = 7.5, assuming risk-neutrality). Following the formulation proposed by Chong, 
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Figure 1. Experimental design. Sample screens for each of the four decision environments in which participants 
chose between a low paying but safe option (a safe option, e.g., “SP”) and an option worth more or nothing (thus 
an uncertain option, “UP”), depending on a risky or uncertain outcome. The UP was always worth €15.00 or 
€0, while the value of the SP varied from trial to trial (covering the whole range between 0 and €15.00 equally 
for each environment). Top row: “games against others” involved one of two coordination games, in which the 
outcome of the uncertain option depended on the choice of another player. Left: a coordination game (a “stag 
hunt”), in which both participants could obtain the highest payoff by both choosing the UP option. However, if 
one chose the UP alone, he/she earned nothing. Right: an anti-coordination game (an “entry game”), in which 
participants could only obtain the high payoff if they chose the UP option but their counterpart did not. If 
both chose the UP, both earned nothing at all. Bottom row: “games against nature” involved one of two lottery 
extractions, in which the outcome of the risky or uncertain option depended on an extraction from a real urn. 
Left: in a risky lottery condition, the probability of winning was known (and occurred with a probability of 0.5). 
Right: in an ambiguous lottery condition, the probability of winning was unknown.
Figure 2. Estimated probability of choosing an uncertain option (“UP”) (y-axis) relative to a lower paying but 
safer alternative (“SP”) (x-axis) in games against others (darker shades) or games against nature (lighter shades). 
Symbols represent the raw percentages of UP choices observed in each of the four decision environments, 
for each SP value: coordination games (i.e., stag hunts, crosses), anti-coordination games (i.e., entry games, 
triangles), lotteries with risky/known success probability (of p = 0.5, squares), or ambiguous/unknown success 
probability (circles). Shaded ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals of the estimated fixed effects.
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Camerer and Ho20, it can than also be computed that, both level-2, which constitute 25% of players, and level-3 
players (12%), should display 3 switches.
For instance, a risk-neutral level-2 players should switch from the UP to the SP at lower SP ranges than a 
risk-neutral level-1 player (specifically, at a value of SP = 3). Indeed, such a level-2 player believes that, for SP 
values between 4 and 7.5, there are too many level-0 and level-1 players choosing the UP, decreasing its expected 
value below the corresponding SP value. On the other hand, when level-2 players think level-1 players have now 
begun to choose the SP (i.e., at 7.5), level-2 players have an incentive to switch back to the UP option, and should 
continue to choose it until the SP value reaches 12.00 (where they are predicted to be indifferent between the two 
options). This increase in switch frequency from level-1 play to levels 2 and 3 increases further for level-4 players 
(5% of players), which should in fact switch 9 times (and we truncated the distribution at k = 4). Importantly, 
these switching predictions can also hold when relaxing the assumption of Camerer et al.20 that subjects know the 
distribution of players. For instance, a level-k player that only believes others are randomly distributed over the 
possible k-1 types, leads to the same switching predictions as above for players levels 0 through 2, while level 3 
players now switch 5 times instead of 3, and level 4 players switch 7 times instead of 9. In both cases, higher levels 
of reasoning can be associated with higher number of switches.
Figure 3. Average certainty equivalents across decision environments. For each participants and each decision 
environment, certainty equivalents were computed. Error bars represent standard error of the means. Asterisks 
represent significance levels of paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: ***p < 0.001.
Figure 4. Left: entropy is increased in games involving anti-coordination (i.e., an entry game); relative to any 
of the other tested environments. Right: coordination and anti-coordination oppositely affect decision times, 
respectively facilitating and “disfacilitating” uncertain choices, relative to risky and ambiguous lotteries with 
the same potential monetary payoffs. Error bars represent standard error of the means. Asterisks represent 
significance levels of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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This characterization has at least two intriguing properties for our purposes: first, level-0 and level-4 players 
display similar rates of switching, thus similar levels of entropy, highlighting a theoretical difference, absent for 
SHs, between strategic entropy (e.g., level-4 players, but also levels 2 and 3) and non-strategic entropy (level-0 
players), or between behavior that is random and behavior that may “look” random but is not. Second, the average 
switching rate of such a distribution of players is 3.9, which is very close to the average switching rates of 4 we 
observe. Relatedly, the distribution of switches predicted by the theory suggests that peaks should be observed at a 
threshold frequency of 1 (33% of level-1 players) and 3 (22% and 12% of level 2 and 3 players, respectively), which 
is also where we observe the two highest concentrations of players (respectively, 19% and 25%).
We next asked whether the higher entropy levels of the entry game could be due to relatively few partici-
pants displaying a particularly high number of switches in this game. However, Fig. 5 suggests that this isn’t 
the case: the majority of subjects increased the number of choice switches when passing from coordination to 
anti-coordination games.
Finally, we find that the frequency of choice switches predicted expected earnings only for the entry game 
(r = 0.28, p < 0.05), while it decreased them in the two lotteries (rs > 0.3, ps < 0.01) (and non-significantly 
decreased them in the stag hunt).
Discussion
In this study we provide an empirical answer to an old question: whether betting on others is perceived like 
betting on nature1. We conjectured that one potentially important difference between these two domains is that 
humans should think recursively (i.e., strategically) about other intentional/motivated agents but not about “blind 
nature”. We further hypothesized that, behaviorally, a sign of recursive reasoning should especially be detectable 
in an anti-coordination environment (i.e., in which choices can mutually offset one another, such as an entry 
game), rather than a more cooperative one involving coordination (in which choices can reinforce one another, 
such as a stag hunt). We investigated this by systematically comparing binary decisions between a safe option (i.e., 
a safe payoff that we progressively increased) and an uncertain option in four decision environments that differed 
only in the nature of the uncertainty and were identical in their monetary incentives: games against others (pure 
coordination vs. anti-coordination), and games against nature (risky vs. ambiguous lotteries). We find that i) in 
terms of certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific payoff-threshold that makes subjects indifferent between the two 
options), uncertainty is similarly high under anti-coordination and ambiguous lotteries, intermediate in the risky 
lotteries and lowest in stag hunts; ii) subjects switch between options more frequently, displaying higher entropy, 
under anti-coordination relative to any of the other tested environments; and that iii) subjects take more time to 
reach their decisions in anti-coordination games, relative to any other environment.
Figure 5. Choice switches in coordination and anti-coordination games (i.e., stag hunts and entry games, 
respectively). Circle areas indicate how many participants switched a given amount of times between choosing 
a safe option, as opposed to an uncertain option, as the value of the safe payoff was gradually increased. 
Observations along the dashed lines represent participants that adopted “perfect threshold strategies” (i.e., only 
one “choice switch”), in the stag hunts (horizontal dashed line) and in the entry games (vertical dashed line). 
We observe that perfect thresholds (i.e., one switch) are the modal frequency in stag hunts, used by 42% of 
participants, while this percentage drops to 19% in entry games (where the modal choice-switch frequency was 
3, for 25% of participants). An equal number of choices switches across the two games would have resulted in 
observations lying on the main diagonal. The figure shows that the majority of participants increased switching 
frequency when passing from coordination to anti-coordination games, as most observations are above the 
diagonal.
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Our certainty equivalent results corroborate and extend previous findings suggesting that coordination and 
anti-coordination have an opposite impact on uncertainty. For instance, Camerer and Karjalainen28 observed that 
participants exhibit aversion to uncertainty in an anti-coordination game (i.e., a “miscoordination” game), while 
Fox and Weber27 observed affinity to uncertainty in a coordination game. Finally, Chark and Chew26 recently cor-
roborated both of these findings by showing that subjects prefer to play a coordination game strategically, rather 
than non-strategically (i.e., when a random lottery makes the selection for the player), but that the opposite is true 
for anti-coordination environments. Our results depict an even more systematic picture: certainty equivalents are 
(much) higher in coordination games, intermediate in risky lotteries, and lowest in anti-coordination, with each 
condition differing significantly from the other.
We extend these previous findings in two ways. First, we show that, on average, subjects exhibit similarly high 
aversion to uncertainty in anti-coordination environments and ambiguous lotteries. We suggest that this could 
emerge because recursive reasoning changes choices in anti-coordination but not coordination games, decreas-
ing subjects’ confidence about their ability to infer the choices of others. This is also in line with two studies that 
showed how removing ambiguity from the social context - by having participants coordinate with similar (vs. 
dissimilar) others29, or friends (vs. strangers)30, leads to affinity towards uncertainty in stag hunts, but to higher 
aversion towards uncertainty in entry games.
However, we believe that the most important insight afforded by our results, relative to those, is that certainty 
equivalents alone might provide an excessively restricted window into the decision processes underlying strategic 
uncertainty. Indeed, even though certainty equivalents are similar in competitive/anti-coordination games and 
ambiguous lotteries, we find that subjects make their decisions in a radically different way in these two decision 
domains: subjects “switched options”, much more frequently in the anti-coordination environment, relative to any 
of the other tested environments. The studies mentioned above26–28 did not measure entropy across the decision 
environments. The main novelty of our result is thus to dissociate between two measures: while some environ-
ments, such as ambiguity and anti-coordination, can elicit similar average certainty equivalents (i.e., “betting 
preferences”) they can elicit very different decision patterns in terms of entropy. We thus suggest that despite the 
similar levels of aversion to uncertainty, the effects of anti-coordinating with others should not be reduced to 
mere ambiguity-aversion (or source preference) in individual decision making26.
A parsimonious explanation of these results could be attributed to the fact that anti-coordination environ-
ments are simply more complex than coordination environments or lotteries. Indeed, complexity or task difficulty 
could account for the lower confidence (and thus higher entropy) of anti-coordination, as well as the increased 
decision times we observe in these environments. However, this interpretation does not seem to provide a clear 
answer as to what can make social decisions “complex”. In fact, at least superficially, stag hunts and entry games 
can be represented in a simple manner: both of our variants involved only two possible options, two players and 
four possible outcomes, yet anti-coordination resulted in very different behavioral patterns. Cognitive hierarchy 
theories might provide an explanation as to why “anti-coordinating” is more complex: recursive thinking only 
switches one’s choices in this domain and this can increase both the variance of one’s own response as well one’s 
estimates of the choices of others.
Moreover, our parametric modulation of the sure payoff could also suggest that the increased hierarchical rea-
soning that occurs in mismatching games is not circular, but follows a specific pattern that is predicted by cogni-
tive hierarchy models18,20. In fact, extending our introductory examples, cognitive hierarchy models predict that, 
in both of our coordination games, (risk-neutral) level-1 players should always choose the UP option when the SP 
value is lower than half of the UP value (thus €7.50, since this is the expected value of a random lottery that pays 
€15.00 or 0 with probability 0.5). Level-2 players on the other hand believe they are interacting with a mixture of 
level-0 and level-1 players. Consequently, they expect their counterparts will most likely choose the UP for low SP 
values (i.e., SP <7.5) (since half level-0 players and all the level-1 players are doing this), but the UP at higher SP 
values (SP >7.5). As illustrated in the introduction, while this belief doesn’t change the behavior of level-2 players 
(or even higher level players) in stag hunts (relative to level-1 players), it does in entry games. Indeed, level-2 
players in the entry game should choose the SP option for low SP values more frequently than level-1 players, as 
an evasion tactic to avoid the wave of lower level players who are expected to choose the UP in this SP range. By 
the same token, however, since level-2 players expect that relatively less lower-level players choose the UP at high 
SP values, they might choose the UP in such a SP range.
Our findings are in line with these cognitive hierarchy predictions. In fact, consistent with level-2 play, espe-
cially at low SP values (i.e., SP < 7.5), the probability of UP choices (see Fig. 3) was lowest in the anti-coordination 
game, relative to any of the other decision environments. Conversely, at high SP values, we observe a slight “kink” 
upwards in the entry game curve, relative to the corresponding lottery environments (thus relative to hypothet-
ical level-1 play). This plausibly resulted from the fact that (in addition to the lower rate of UP choices at low 
SPs) some (i.e., level-2) players chose the UP even when the SP was relatively high (i.e., SP  > 7.50), resulting in 
an overall more slanted slope of the estimated logistic function fit to the entry game. Indeed, these players could 
be rather certain that, at such high SP ranges, most possible counterparts would choose the SP, thus reasoning 
one step forward and choosing the opposite. Intriguingly, previous research on cognitive hierarchy31 suggests 
that, on average, experimental participants exhibit levels of reasoning that approximate a Poisson distribution 
with lambda = 1.5, and the response curve we observe for the entry game seems in line with such a distribution 
of players. Moreover, we find that the aggregate switching frequency predicted by that lambda value resembles 
what we observe in the data. Future research could further address this by relating choices and switching patterns 
under anti-coordination to choices in other games, such as the p-beauty contest, in which levels of reasoning are 
easier to identify18–20.
At last, a possible alternative explanation to our results is that, in addition to hierarchical reasoning, there 
could be another potentially important difference between games against others and games against nature, 
namely, “social preferences”. Indeed, it can be formally shown that even simply adding an “altruism” parameter 
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into the payoff function of a game - thus making agents (positively) interested in the payoff of their counterparts 
- can increase the attractiveness of the UP choices (relative to SP) in stag hunts, and of SP choices in entry games, 
which is at least consistent with our threshold findings. Our study was not intended to address this issue, however 
it is worth noting that while certain social preference models could account for our threshold findings, they would 
seem less at ease with the increased number of switches observed in EGs, as well as the increased decision times 
that occur in this domain. With notable exceptions32,33, most of these models are in fact - as the general term states 
- “social preference” models. Neither these nor “source preference” or ambiguity models26 explicitly feature the 
“social inferences”34,35 that underlie belief (and higher order belief) formation and that were the original objective 
of early coordination researchers4. For instance, Cooper & Dejong4 opened their seminal paper with the follow-
ing: “A weakness of the Nash equilibrium concept for noncooperative games is that it may not generate a unique 
outcome. In this case it might be augmented by a hypothesis refining the beliefs of players about the strategies 
selected by their opponents” [cursive ours]. We speculate that a possible belief-refinement that could be consist-
ent with our results is one that attributes a role to social-projection36, similarity29,37–40 or “expected mimicry”41, to 
initial belief formation in symmetric games (and similarity-sensitive games specifically42). In fact, if beliefs about 
others are anchored to one’s personally preferred outcomes, this could generate assurance in stag hunts (where 
agents arguably prefer the pareto-efficient option), while simultaneously increasing uncertainty in entry games.
In conclusion, our results suggest that, from a behavioral perspective, games against others and games against 
nature are not treated similarly: in anti-coordination environments, humans exhibit exceptionally high degrees 
of “choice switching” (or entropy), relative to environments that require them to match/coordinate their choices, 
or to bet on (risky or ambiguous) lotteries with identical monetary incentives. We suggest that this behavioral 
pattern emerges from hierarchical reasoning about others in interdependent decision problems, something that 
does not apply to games against nature (and does not alter choices in stag hunts). Indeed, it would be interesting 
to individuate a one-shot game with nature capable of eliciting similar entropy levels as the ones observed here in 
the entry games. Our findings also suggest that different skills or strategies may underlie cooperative and compet-
itive coordination, something which could also be in line with evolutionary and neuroscientific evidence43–46. In 
cooperative environments requiring subjects to tacitly coordinate their choices, recursive reasoning about others 
does not necessarily affect one’s choices, while it can lead to potentially strategic entropy in competitive situations 
requiring subjects to anti-coordinate their choices.
Methods
Participants. In 4 experimental sessions, 75 students (35 females, mean age = 23.4, SD = 3.7) took part in 
the tasks of interest. The experiment was conducted at the CEEL lab (Computable and Experimental Economics 
Laboratory) of the University of Trento (Italy) and participants were recruited via email through the lab’s data-
base. All participants provided informed consent for the treatment and publication of their anonymized data. All 
assessments were approved by the Research Ethics Committee (agreement number 2008-008, “The neural bases 
of individual and strategic uncertainty”) of the University of Trento, Italy. All experiments were performed in 
accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the 
current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Procedures. As soon as they entered the lab, participants were designated to a computer cubicle (by extract-
ing a bingo chip from a bag). Here, they found the paper instructions to the games, which were also read out loud 
by the experimenters. The instructions introduced the four decision environments of interest: two-player SHs and 
EGs, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries, each of which was described in a neutral manner. Participants were 
explained that, in all environments, they would be required to choose between a certain payoff (“SP”), worth a 
given euro amount, and a potentially higher paying but uncertain payoff (“UP”), which was always worth either 
€15.00 or 0. In all environments, if participants chose the SP, they would earn that euro amount no matter what, 
while the choosing the UP had different consequences in different environments. SHs were indicated by the label 
“if at least 2” (see Fig. 1): if participants chose the UP in this game, they would earn the maximum earning (i.e., 
€15.00) only if a randomly selected counterpart had also chosen the UP, and 0 otherwise. Conversely, in EGs, labe-
led as “if at most 1”, if participants chose the UP, they would earn the maximum earning only if their counterpart 
had “not” chosen the UP; that is, if both participants chose the UP, both earned 0.
Risky lotteries were indicated by a figure representing an “urn” containing one red and one blue ball (see 
Fig. 1). Outside of the urn, a third ball indicated the “winning color” for the given trial (red or blue, the color was 
randomized). Participants were informed that if they chose the UP in this environment, their outcome would 
depend on a single blind extraction (performed by a randomly designated participant at the end of the experi-
ment). Specifically, they would earn the maximum if the color of the extracted ball was the winning color, and 0 
otherwise. This urn was physically implemented in front of the participants. Specifically, we ostensibly placed one 
blue ball and one red ball in an initially empty, opaque, cardboard box (with a hole on the top for later extraction), 
and then left it in sight until the end of the session, when the single extraction would take place. We also prepared 
a second, ambiguous urn (called “Urn 2”), in which we placed two red balls and two blue balls. Then we extracted 
two of the balls but did not show participants what color they were. Consequently, participants knew exactly the 
success probability of the risky lottery (p = 0.5), which we used as a baseline probability, but not of the ambiguous 
lottery (which could be either p = 1, p = 0, or p = 0.5). At last, participants were informed that they would make 
a number of decisions in each of these environments, that they would be re-matched with a random participant 
in each trial, and that they would not receive feedback on any of their decisions, until the end of the experiment, 
when a single trial would randomly be extracted and be paid (in private) according to actual choices.
After reading the instructions, participants underwent a thorough comprehension questionnaire that could 
only be concluded by correctly answering each of the questions. We also followed participants’ responses from 
the experimenter’s booth and assisted those that made any errors during this comprehension phase. At the end 
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of this instruction phase we told participants that they had now all answered correctly to the questions and thus 
that the games were clear to all. To further ensure participants that no deception would take place, one participant 
was randomly selected (again via bingo chip) to be a monitor. The monitor followed participants’ anonymized 
responses from the experimenter’s booth in real time and paid them according to their actual choices, in cash, at 
the end of the session. No deception took place throughout the experiment.
Game parameters. As mentioned above, in all environments and in all trials, the UP was always worth 
either €15.00 or 0. On the other hand, the monetary value of the SP varied in each trial, though, in all environ-
ments it was randomly extracted (without reinsertion) from the same set of possible values SP values: 
∈ . . . .SP {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6 5, 7, 7 5, 8, 8 5, 9, 9 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}. SP values thus covered a 
range between €1.00 and €15.00, in steps of 1 (with additional €0.5 values between €6.00 and €10.00). Each of 
these 19 SP values (and consequently each possible SP-UP pairing) was shown only once, for each participant, 
and for each decision environment. It follows that, in total, participants made 19 (SPs) * 4 (decision environ-
ments) = 76 decisions. The order of these 76 unique decisions was fully randomized.
Measures. To investigate whether participants made choices differently in each of these domains, we com-
pared various measures between each of the environments.
As a first proxy for uncertainty, we investigated whether the probability of choosing the UP (as opposed to 
the SP) was affected by increasing SP values and their interaction with the environment (see below for statistical 
details). Then, following Heinemann and colleagues11, and as a more formal proxy for uncertainty, we computed 
certainty equivalents. To do this, we looped through each participants’ choices in each of the four environments, 
using a logistic function (equation 1) to estimate that participant’s probability of choosing the UP (“P(UP)”), 
given a particular SP value (see solid blue lines in Fig. 6, which illustrates the result of this procedure for three 
participants):
=
+ β β− +
P UP
e
( ) 1
1
,
(1)SP( )0 1
This yielded one intercept estimate (β0 indicating the probability of choosing the UP when the SP was 0) and 
one slope estimate (β1, indicating how much the same probability was affected by a single unit change in the SP 
value), for each participant/environment. In this context, certainty equivalents (“CE”) could thus simply be com-
puted as
β β= −CE / , (2)0 1
and they indicated the estimated SP value that made subjects indifferent between choosing the SP and the UP. 
This resulted in N (participants) * 4 (environments) certainty equivalents. In 34 cases out of 300, we observed 
certainty equivalents that were out of range. This could occur for various reasons. For instance, if a participant 
always/never chose the UP in a given environment this resulted in certainty equivalents tending to +/− infinity. 
We handled these cases in two ways. In a first approach, we manually corrected such out of range certainty equiv-
alents, by setting the ones that were lower than 0 to 0 and those that were higher than 15.00 to 15.00. In a second, 
we excluded these certainty equivalents altogether (thus labeling them as missing values). Since our final results 
were completely unaffected by this distinction, we disregard this matter and report results from the first of these 
two approaches.
To investigate whether subjects switched back and forth between the SP and UP option, as SPs increased, we 
computed two related measures. First, we computed entropy measures by applying the following binary entropy 
Figure 6. Illustration of entropy. Circles represent choices (1 = uncertain option, 0 = safe payoff) by three 
different participants. Solid lines are logistic fits to those choices, estimating the probability of choosing a 
potentially high paying but uncertain option, relative to a lower paying but safe alternative. Dashed lines 
represent the entropy related to the same logistic fits. The participants in the left most panel uses a “perfect 
threshold” strategy (thus, he/she exhibits no entropy). The participants in the middle and right panels have 
similar thresholds to the one on the left, yet they exhibit progressively higher levels of entropy.
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function (equation 3, below) to the vector of probabilities of choosing the UP option (obtained from the logistic 
fits above):
= − − − −Entropy p UP log p UP p UP log p UP( ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) (3)2 2
This function is maximal (i.e., 1) when subjects’ estimated p(UP) was equal to 0.5, and it decreases both for 
increasing and decreasing probabilities. Since the entropy function gives infinite values for p(UP) of 0 or 1, these were 
manually set to 0. As can be seen in Fig. 6 (Fig. 6), participants can have roughly the same certainty equivalents while 
still exhibiting a noticeable heterogeneity in entropy. Having obtained an entropy measure for each data point, we 
aggregated them over the SP values, for each participant/environment, thus again obtaining N*4 measures of entropy.
In addition to this, we counted “choice switches” that we expected to be raised by recursive reasoning in games 
with strategic substitutability. Specifically, we ordered trials by SP values in ascending order (for each participant/envi-
ronment). Normally, participants choose the UP for low SP values and shift to choosing the SP option at some higher 
value of the SP11. In a perfect threshold strategy, this should occur only once (e.g., for perfect/deterministic threshold 
strategies), though often subjects exhibit imperfect threshold strategies, or non-threshold strategies, switching back 
and forth between SP and UP, as SP values increase47. We thus proceeded to measure this by simply counting the num-
ber of switches exhibited by each participant in each environment (as opposed to analyzing the continuous entropy 
measure described above). Notably, these counts correlated strongly with the entropy estimates (with a correlation 
coefficient of R = 0.94, p < 0.001), and all of the results reported above for one measure also held for the other.
To obtain a proxy for performance in our decision tasks, we investigated how coordination an 
anti-coordination affected expected earnings. To compute the latter, we did the following. In all the environ-
ments, if a participant chose the SP, the corresponding SP value was attributed to him or her, since this depended 
on nothing else. On the other hand, if one chose the UP, his or her expected payoff depended on two aspects: first, 
what game was being played (e.g., coordination or anti-coordination) and second, what others chose. Thus, in the 
stag hunt, since one had equal chances of being matched to any counterpart, we computed the expected payoff as
= . ∗ ∑
−
−EV UP x
n
15 00
( )
1
, (4)i UPx
Stag i
( )
where the left side of the equation is the expected value of a UP choice in a stag hunt for participant “i” on trial 
“x”; while the right side of the equation is simply the proportion of (non-i) participants who also chose the UP 
on the same trial (x) and “n” is the total number of participants (minus one to exclude participant “i”). In short, 
if one chose the UP in the stag hunt, his or her expected payoff is proportional to the number of others who also 
chose the UP on the same trial. On the other hand, the expected value of choosing the UP in the entry game was 
simply computed as
= . ∗



− ∑
−

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,
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since, in this case, one’s chances of earning the high €15.00 prize was inversely proportional to the number of oth-
ers who also chose the UP on the target trial. Having obtained these measures of expected earnings, we aggregated 
them over the SP values, so as to again obtain one measure for each participant and environment.
Finally, as an additional proxy for the hypothesized (recursive) reasoning of entry games, relative to the other 
environments, we investigated the impact of the tested decision environments on response times (of which we 
took the log, to better align with normality assumptions). Due to a programming error, the response times of 
two sessions were not recorded. However, Rubinstein22 suggests that typical response time experiments involve 
roughly 20 participants, and 100–200 trials per participant. We have fewer trials (76) but more participants (39 
participants.), suggesting that the decision time results are reliable.
Statistical analyses. Following Heinemann and colleagues11, we used logistic hierarchical models48 to clus-
ter choices by participant, which were treated as random effects, and to estimate fixed effects (i.e., the dichoto-
mous choice of UP or SP) on the basis of the following predictors: the decision environment (4 levels: risky lottery, 
ambiguous lottery, stag hunt and entry game), the sure payoff term, and the interaction between this and the 
decision environment. Further comparisons between environments were carried out with Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests. All analysis were carried out in R49.
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